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JUDGE JENNIFER W. ELROD: Good morning. Welcome to this panel discussion
on Communications Law Reform. I am Jennifer Elrod, and I was so pleased to
be asked to moderate this panel yet again this year. Although I am in Texas, I
don’t deal a lot in telecommunications work. I’ve done this a couple of times,
and I said, “Well, now that you’ve got the net neutrality and the spectrum
auctions and all those things resolved and fixed, what is there going to be to
talk about this year?” But I learned quickly that even though the technology
may move quickly, the law often doesn’t follow, and in fact, that is what this
topic is about today.
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As you may know, the technology and communications sector represents
approximately one-sixth of our nation’s economy. Despite the overall state of
this economy, the industry continues to foster innovation, create jobs, and
promote economic growth. This highly competitive industry is undergoing a
transformative convergence of previously distinct industry areas: media,
wireless, and wireline. Yet the agencies that oversee the industry remain
guided by stovepiped regulatory principles developed in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. This legacy legal regime has prompted calls for a
comprehensive reexamination of the legal and regulatory structure facing the
industry. Our panel will examine how the FCC and the FTC and other
government agencies, both national and international, should or should not
regulate the communications industry and explore possible avenues for reform.
Delighted to have the all-star panel today. We just absolutely have an allstar panel, and I am going to make introductions now of the panelists in the
order that they will be speaking for their introductory remarks. Then they will
give brief introductory remarks. The panel will have a discussion, and then we
will conclude with questions from the audience. So that will be our format
today.
Our first speaker today is a repeat player, the Honorable Robert M.
McDowell. Robert M. McDowell was first appointed to a seat on the FCC by
President George W. Bush and unanimously confirmed by the Senate in 2006.
When he was reappointed to the Commission on June 2, 2009, Commissioner
McDowell became the first Republican to be appointed to an independent
agency by President Barack Obama. He was unanimously confirmed by the
Senate on June 25, 2009. During his time at the FCC, he has worked to help
consumers in the communications marketplace enjoy the benefits of more
choices, lower prices, and useful innovations through increased competition.
He brings to the FCC approximately sixteen years of private sector experience
in the communications industry. He graduated cum laude from Duke
University, has a law degree from the College of William and Mary, and he
formerly practiced at the national law firm of Arter & Hadden. But the thing I
like most about him that I learned in my research is that Commissioner
McDowell has deep Texas connections and that his grandfather, I believe, was
a judge in Val Verde, Texas. And having been a former state judge in Texas
myself, I feel like that makes us connected.
Laughter.
JUDGE JENNIFER W. ELROD: Our next speaker today is the Honorable Ajit Pai.
Ajit Pai was nominated to the FCC by President Barack Obama, and on May 7,
2012, he was confirmed unanimously by the United States Senate. On May
14, 2012, he was sworn in for a term that concludes on June 30, 2016. His
focus is on creating a regulatory environment in which competition and
innovation will flourish to the benefit of American consumers. He specifically
works on projects to remove uncertainty that can deter businesses and investors
from taking risk, to revisit outdated regulations, and to set clear modernized
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rules of the road. He also has a priority to increase promptly the availability of
spectrum for high-value uses. He has been shaped by over a decade and a half
of experience in communications law and policy. He has served in the FCC’s
Office of the General Counsel, serving most prominently as the Deputy
General Counsel, and his career has truly been expansive, and he served in all
three areas of the federal government, in the DOJ, on Capitol Hill as the Chief
Counsel to the Senate Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on the Constitution,
Civil Rights, and Property Rights. And my favorite thing on his résumé is that
he was once a law clerk to the Honorable Marty Feldman, a wonderful judge in
our Fifth Circuit. Commissioner Pai received a BA with Honors from Harvard
University in 1994 and a JD from the University of Chicago in 1997. We are
delighted to have you join our panel here today.
And then we move to the first of our professors today. We have
Professor Daniel Crane. Professor Daniel Crane teaches at the University of
Michigan Law School contracts, antitrust, and intellectual property, and
various advanced antitrust courses. He was previously a professor of law at
the Benjamin Cardozo School of Law and a visiting professor at New York
University Law School and University of Chicago Law School. In the spring
of 2009, he taught antitrust law on a Fulbright Scholarship in Lisbon. His
recent scholarship is focused primarily on antitrust and economic regulation,
particularly the institutional structure of antitrust enforcement, predatory
pricing, bundling, and the antitrust implications of the various patent practices.
Professor Crane’s work has appeared in the University of Chicago Law
Review, the California Law Review, the Michigan Law Review, and the Cornell
Law Review, among others. He is the author of several books on antitrust law,
including The Institutional Structure of Antitrust Enforcement, published in
2011. Thank you, Professor Crane, for joining us here today.
Our other professor today is Professor Jonathan Baker. Jonathan B.
Baker is a professor of law at American University Washington College of
Law where he teaches courses in the areas of antitrust and economic
regulation. He served as the Chief Economist of the FCC from 2009 to 2011
and as the Director of the Bureau of Economics at the FTC from 1995 to 1998.
Previously, he worked as a senior economist on the President’s Council of
Economic Advisors, Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Attorney
General for Economics in the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice,
and assistant professor at Dartmouth’s Amos Tuck School of Business
Administration and attorney-advisor to the Acting Chairman of the FTC and an
antitrust lawyer in private practice. He is the co-author of an antitrust case
book, past editorial chair of Antitrust Law Journal, and a past member of the
Council of the American Bar Association’s Section of Antitrust Law. He has a
JD from Harvard and a PhD in economics from Stanford University.
And next, we have our other Commissioner, and we are delighted to have
her joining us today, the Honorable Maureen Ohlhausen. Maureen K.
Ohlhausen was sworn in as a Commissioner of the FTC on April 4, 2012, for a
term that expires in September 2018. Prior to joining the Commission, she was
a partner at Wilkinson Barker Knauer where she focused on FTC issues,
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including privacy, data protection, and cybersecurity.
Commissioner
Ohlhausen previously served at the Commission for eleven years, so it was like
coming home.
MAUREEN K. OHLHAUSEN: Absolutely. Yes.
Laughter.
JUDGE JENNIFER W. ELROD: Her positions there included Director of the Office
of Policy Planning from 2004 to 2008, where she led the FTC’s Internet
Access Task Force. She was also Deputy Director of that office. Before going
to the FTC or coming to the FTC, I should say, she spent five years at the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit serving as a law clerk for Judge David B.
Sentelle and as a staff attorney. She also clerked for Judge Robert Yock of the
U.S. Court of Federal Claims. She is a graduate with distinction from George
Mason University School of Law and with honors from the University of
Virginia. Thank you for joining us.
Let’s get right to it. They don’t want to hear any more from me. They
want to hear from you, Commissioner McDowell.
ROBERT M. MCDOWELL: Well, thank you. It’s great to be here. Thank you to
The Federalist Society for having us. Can everyone hear me? Is this on?
Attention K-Mart shoppers. Okay. Saturday morning.
I do feel as if I should start off with you here by saying, “May it please
the Court,” but I will skip over that. So there’s a lot to talk about today, and I
believe that the deal was I would focus on sort of international regulation or
potential international regulation of the Internet. I have a sneaking suspicion
that Commissioner Pai is going to talk about some things that I will just give
him a blank check that I agree with whatever he’s about to say. I’ll be shocked
if that’s not the case. We do have a lot of work to do here domestically as
well. So, when we open it up to a fuller discussion, happy to chime in on that
as well, but I only have five minutes and now only four, so I better get going.
Laughter.
JUDGE JENNIFER W. ELROD: But who is counting?
ROBERT M. MCDOWELL: Well, you are.
JUDGE JENNIFER W. ELROD: I am.
Laughter.
ROBERT M. MCDOWELL: So for those who don’t know, there is something
called the International Telecommunication Union. It used to be the
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International Telegraph Union. We call it the ITU, but it was founded in 1845
or ‘46 to adjudicate the termination charges of telegraphs from one country to
another, telegraph messages. It has since evolved and is always looking for a
new mission, so with the invention of the telephone, it then administered
international telephone rates. To this day—it’s a treaty-based organization, by
the way—that operates under the auspices of the U.N., so you can call it quite
accurately an “arm of the U.N.” It’s based in Geneva, but it also administers
things like satellite orbital slots, some international harmonization of spectrum,
the uses of spectrum, things like that.
But there has been a movement afoot for about ten years to expand the
ITU’s jurisdiction or maybe to create a new international body through the
U.N, to regulate the Internet. I am not making that up. That is not a black
helicopter conspiracy theory. It is actually the truth. And there is a treaty that
starts in two weeks in Dubai. It starts on December the third. It’s called the
World Conference on International Telecommunications, WCIT, “wicket,” and
for you cricket fans, I know that has a different meaning, but we call it the
“wicket.” And, by the way, there is a famous wicket planning by Ajit Pai.
You know that, right? He’s world-famous. If you Google “Ajit Pai,” you are
not going to see his face first. You’re going to see the other guy.
Laughter.
AJIT V. PAI: To my father’s chagrin, yes.
ROBERT M. MCDOWELL: That it’s not you or that the family name is—
AJIT V. PAI: Well, that it’s not me. He’s a big cricket fan.
ROBERT M. MCDOWELL: Oh, okay. But he’s famous. But he is a big deal.
Anyway, as is Commissioner Pai, by the way. In fact, Commissioner Pai has
done such a great job thus far at the Commission that Hollywood has already
released a movie about him. It’s called Life of Pai.
Laughter.
ROBERT M. MCDOWELL: You’ve seen the trailers for that, but that’s a different
story altogether.
JUDGE JENNIFER W. ELROD: Do you put up with this?
Laughter.
AJIT V. PAI: Welcome to my world.
ROBERT M. MCDOWELL: It’s part of the freshman hazing we have at the
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FCC—no.
So, on December 3, 193 countries will convene in Dubai for this WCIT
and to renegotiate a treaty that was agreed to back in 1988. This treaty, to
make a long story short, really sets a stage for governments—international
governments in particular—but governments keeping their hands off of
emerging technologies and computer-to-computer communications as they
were known back then or what later became the Internet. And I think most
people will agree that the Internet works quite well without the government’s
help and that governments don’t work so well, but unfortunately, there have
been over the past ten years a number of efforts and a number of international
meetings where countries—I’ll say China and Russia, but the Arab States, a lot
of developing world nations, Iran, Cuba, and others—that have been pushing
for more international oversight—Brazil and India, as well. In fact, India
about a year, year and a half ago, introduced a resolution on the floor of the
U.N. for there to be a new regulatory body under the auspices of the U.N. just
for purposes of regulating the Internet. And the motivations for this are
numerous. They are economic. There are some countries that see the Internet
dominated by American companies sitting on piles of cash. In a lot of
developing world nations and even industrialized world nations, phone
companies are either state-owned or partially state-owned, and so they see an
opportunity to charge maybe on a per-click basis or other basis for
international web traffic. If you go to a certain web destination and you’re in
that country, it would flow into—the cash would flow into the treasury
ultimately of that country; so economic, and then certainly there are a lot of
authoritarian regimes that are supporting international control of the Internet
for political purposes. Hopefully, I don’t need to explain that, but they fear the
free flow of information across the Net because it could lead to their demise if
they’re a despot. So there are a number of motivations out there.
The concern is that we now have, as of November 13, a number of
proposals in black and white. So, cutting to the chase, you know, after months
of chatter and rumor and all the rest, we now have formal proposals from
member states, from countries, before the ITU to do just that—to have the ITU
regulate the Internet. The most recent that came out is from Russia, and this is
a copy of it translated into English. It quite literally expands the definition of
the ITU’s jurisdiction to include the Internet and processing and IP addresses.
Who has on them right now a wireless device?
Show of hands.
ROBERT M. MCDOWELL: I figured that would be the case. And who can send
an email from that wireless device?
Show of hands.
ROBERT M. MCDOWELL: Okay. So each of those devices have something
called an IP address that tells other people and the computers—their
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computers—where to send, where you are, and how does it get to your device.
Russia and the Arab States and others have proposed that the ITU manage
IP addresses. Well, that reaches into every web-connected chip, computer chip
in the world, and there are billions of those.
So what is troubling—and I’ll try to end on a more positive note—is the
leadership of the ITU itself. There are these offices in Geneva. We pay dues,
just like we do to the U.N., and that supports the ITU. They have employees,
and there are officers of the ITUs, so a CEO we call a “secretary-general” and
others. They are supposed to be serving the member states of the ITU. They
have just recently put out on November 15, so two days after the Russian
submission and two weeks after the Arab States’ submission on November 1
and other countries as well—they posted a blog, which is a little unsettling, as
if the rest of this isn’t unsettling, but this is even more unsettling. I am
quoting, “Despite what you may have been led to believe, there have not been
any proposals calling for a change from the bottom-up multi-stakeholder
model of Internet governance to an ITU-controlled model.”1
That is just flatly false, unless two days after the fact they hadn’t read the
submissions or two weeks after the fact they hadn’t read the submissions that
were submitted to the ITU. These submissions are in plain black and white.
There is no ambiguity. It is not over-reading.
So the good news is that they went on to say, “Internet control is simply
not in the ITU mandate, and ITU will continue to fully support the multistakeholder approach, which it initiated some 10 years ago for the World
Summit of the Information Society.” WCIT-12, the upcoming meeting,
“cannot empower governments to exercise greater regulation of the Internet.”
But what’s unsettling here is the first sentence, and there’s been a habit that
we’ve seen of ITU leadership saying one thing to one crowd and another thing
to another crowd or sort of denying the reality that, no, there are dozens and
dozens of these member states that are proposing these ideas.
So, as our delegation goes to Dubai, they have behind them—they have
been sort of fueled by a rare thing in Washington, and that was a bipartisan and
unanimous consensus of both houses of Congress—resolutions that were
introduced in both houses of Congress, directing them to not agree to one
single expansion of ITU, a jurisdiction into the Internet space. So that gives
me some confidence.
At the same time, ITU leadership has been saying that they will try to
continue in the tradition of the ITU to make sure that the WCIT negotiation is
done through consensus and unanimity, that there will be no changes unless all
the countries agree, which probably means that what will come out of it will be
these high-level, almost platitudes regarding Internet deployment is good,
infrastructure deployment is good, et cetera.
The concern, though, is that some of the proposals made, when things
really—when we get down to brass tacks and the negotiation really starts—is
1. Paul Conneally, WCIT-12: Clarification Needed During Open Letter Season, ITUBLOG (Nov. 15,
2012), http://itu4u.wordpress.com/2012/11/15/wcit-12-clarification-needed-during-open-letter-season.
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that there are a lot of seemingly innocuous reasons that are sort of wrapped
around more nefarious proposals. It might be Internet infrastructure
deployment. It might be keeping children safe. It might be a lot of issues that
use the sales pitches to then give the ITU a hook into this space, and there are
some countries that are already saying that the ITU currently under the 1988
language already has jurisdiction over the Internet.
So if these same sort of aggressive expansionists are willing to sort of
conjure false meaning from plain text when the meaning is obviously not there,
think of what they’ll do if you give them even the tiniest leverage point with
expanded language, and even if it’s just sort of a high-level agreement on a
principle. So that is one concern I have.
And also the other concern at the outset is that, obviously, ITU
leadership, the career folks leading this meeting, have a point of view, and they
are not really supposed to have a point of view. They are supposed to let the
membership decide. The good news is that this is a treaty that if the State
Department—and the State Department leads these negotiations. What they
bring back has to be ratified by the U.S. Senate. I don’t think—despite
election results—I don’t think the U.S. Senate would pass or ratify a treaty that
has any expansion of the ITU’s jurisdiction into this space. There seems to be
great unanimity on that, and Congress is trying to celebrate those areas where
it can agree, so that’s all good, but then it’s not over.
So I said at the outset, this has been going on for about ten years. There’s
another meeting in May, and there will be several meetings a year for the rest
of our lives.
Laughter.
ROBERT M. MCDOWELL: So when the gray hair turns white, we will all still be
talking about this. So I think it’s important for us all to remain vigilant about
this, because the folks pushing for this are patient and persistent
incrementalists, and that is ultimately freedom’s biggest threat, is the
incremental erosion of it. It is not going to happen in one big gulp. Of course,
you can’t buy a Big Gulp in New York City, but that’s another matter.
Laughter.
ROBERT M. MCDOWELL: Speaking of freedom.
ATTENDEE: And soon in Chicago.
ROBERT M. MCDOWELL: Oh, really? Well, should have guessed. I’m amazed
San Francisco wasn’t first, actually, with this idea, but I think they’re jealous.
So this isn’t alarmist. This is not Black Helicopter conspiracy theory.
The last thing I’ll end on, at a minimum, the destruction that comes out of this
isn’t that the U.S. will agree to a treaty giving the U.N. control over the
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Internet. It’s that it could create uncertainty in the marketplace. The Internet
is a global network of networks without borders, and of course, the content and
the applications are all part of that, but from an engineer’s perspective, you
don’t see countries there. It’s a network all over the globe, and when you send
an email, those packets—those ones and zeros—are being routed all over the
world, and you don’t know where they’ve been by the time they show up to
their intended destination.
And you can’t really have a bifurcated or balkanized Internet. So even if
we are able to escape the Dubai conference with freedom intact, should there
be a strengthening movement for more regulation—and as it usually works is
that you end up sort of negotiating against yourself, right? They maintain,
“Well, here is a rule. Why can’t you walk down this road of rules? Just take a
step down this road,” and before you know it, you’re running down the road.
But it can raise costs, and it can undermine innovation and investment just by
having the uncertainty there.
So I hope you all will continue to be aware of this, and we all need to
continually for the rest of our lives stay active on it and make sure it doesn’t
happen. Thank you.
JUDGE JENNIFER W. ELROD: Commissioner Pai?
AJIT V. PAI: Thank you, Judge, and thank you to The Federalist Society for
inviting me to participate.
I want to start by commending my colleague, Commissioner McDowell,
for flagging this issue. He did so before virtually anybody else in Washington,
and I am confident that as the treaty negotiations heat up, he will continue to
be an eloquent voice in favor of the multi-stakeholder model that has served
us—and indeed the world citizenry—so well.
The central question that he and others at the ITU are going to be
struggling with is: what is the role of government in a world that is based
essentially on the Internet Protocol? In an all-IP world, in other words, does
regulation have a role? And in answering that question internationally, it
becomes ever more important that we get that answer right domestically. So,
in my comments, I’d like to focus a little bit more on the domestic side.
I think Judge Elrod eloquently put it in her question: How does the
Commission—the FCC—administer the Act in an era of convergence? This is
becoming increasingly difficult, as I have unfortunately had firsthand
experience. When I started in this field in 1997, interpretation of the
Communications Act was relatively simple. If you had a telephone issue, well,
you just go to Title 2 of the Communications Act. If there’s a wireless issue,
you turn to Title 3 for guidance. If it’s a cable or other kind of video issue, you
turn to Title 6. Back in 1997 when I was starting, it was relatively easy to
pigeonhole an issue within one of those titles, but how do you administer the
Act when cable companies and wireless companies are providing the same
voice service that telecommunications companies did? How do you administer
video regulations when telephone companies and wireless companies even are
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competing with cable companies? In an era of convergence, it becomes really
difficult for us at the Commission to try to figure out how to apply these
regulations, and that unfortunately requires the FCC in recent years to engage
in ever more sophisticated legal gymnastics, and having been a veteran of the
General Counsel’s office, I can say I was one of the participants in that effort.
Part of the problem is illustrated, for example, by our use of what’s called
the Ancillary Jurisdiction Doctrine. This doctrine has its origins in a 1968
Supreme Court case called Southwestern Cable in which the Court affirmed
the FCC’s decision to expand its jurisdiction. Even though it didn’t have
explicit statutory authority, the Court said, well, as long as what the FCC is
doing is reasonably ancillary to the Commission’s statutory responsibilities, it
can go ahead and do it.2
Similar to in the constitutional context, you have the substantive due
process issue where what is substantive due process is in the eye of the
beholder. Over time, if we have a convergence and the Act doesn’t clearly
speak to what the Commission’s jurisdiction is, there’s always going to be a
temptation among those with a more regulatory instinct to apply ancillary
jurisdiction to say, “Well, even if we don’t explicitly have authority, it’s sort
of, kind of related to what our responsibilities are.” So, in some cases,
although ancillary jurisdiction might well be reasonable, there are all too often
issues where the Commission is relying upon it and hoping that it survives a
petition for review in the D.C. Circuit, and that’s in my opinion, not the way it
should be. My view is that we should administer the Act the way it is, not the
way we wish it should be, and unless and until Congress decides to revisit the
provisions of the Act, our job as regulators is to simply interpret it as Congress
passed it.
And so the question is, well, where do we go from here? And I think as
we undergo this transition from an era of copper wire networks dominated by
monopolies to an all-IP world in which you have competitors engaging in
massive amounts of investment in terms of intermodal competition, my
opinion is that we should leave behind some of the outdated economic
regulations that characterized policymaking in the 1970s and move to a more
forward-thinking view of what regulation should be.
Just to give you an example of why that is important, just contrast for a
second the way we approach wireline regulation—telephones—to the way we
approach wireless regulation. The wireline regulations—which as I mentioned
arise from Title 2—were themselves crafted based on railroad regulations that
were adopted in the nineteenth century, and so look at the wireless base by
contrast. In 1993, you had Congress and the FCC making a historic bipartisan
decision that they were going to take a different approach to wireless. It was
going to be a very light touch. The FCC and the state and local jurisdictions
2. See United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968) (“[T]he authority which we recognize
today under § 152(a) is restricted to that reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission’s
various responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting. The Commission may, for these purposes,
issue ‘such rules and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with law,’ as
‘public convenience, interest, or necessity requires.’” (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 303(r)).
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were not going to have as much authority to intervene. Wireless service would
not be a common carrier service, as telephone service is.
And what’s the result? Well, back in the early nineties when your only
option was a wireless phone that was a brick—and very few people were able
to afford it—all of us now, as the Commissioner pointed out, have wireless
phones. We all count on functionality and prices that allow us to enjoy those
services. But just imagine for a second what would have happened if we
applied the wireline approach to wireless. You would never get a nationwide
rate plan, because every single wireless carrier would have to abide by both
federal regulations and the regulations of every single one of the fifty states. A
wireless carrier couldn’t subsidize your phone without taking the risk that it
would also have to subsidize a competitor who wanted to offer a phone. A
wireless company couldn’t upgrade its network or take the risk of upgrading its
network without hiring an accountant to keep track of all the regulated cost and
then submit detailed cost studies to the FCC, so that we could look at the books
and make sure that they were doing the right thing in terms of investment.
That’s the kind of approach that would have stifled the wireless industry at the
inception, and so my own opinion is that whether it’s wireless or even other
kinds of intermodal competition—voice, video, what have you—we need to
take a more deregulatory approach—the wireless approach, if you will—as
opposed to the wireline approach.
And so whether in the context of an industry-wide rulemaking or within
the context of a transactional review, which my colleagues on the panel will
talk about, I think that the FCC needs to think creatively about establishing a
framework domestically that will be more hands-off, that will allow the all-IP
world to flourish, and ultimately for consumers to be better off.
So, I look forward to the discussion from my colleagues about how a
transactional review, in particular, can help facilitate that goal, and I once
again thank you, Judge, for moderating and the Society for inviting me.
JUDGE JENNIFER W. ELROD: Thank you. Professor Crane?
PROFESSOR DANIEL CRANE: I’m going to stand. Jon Baker and I agreed that as
professors, it’s against our grain to be seated, and also if you want to stir up
some kind of controversy or argument in the room, it’s better if you start on
your feet. And I think that’s what Jon and I would like to do. It’s what we
usually do when we’re together or apart.
So, I am again really delighted to be here, and I want to thank Judge
Elrod and the other panelists for this wonderful opportunity to address some
interesting questions.
The question I want to talk about is the overlapping jurisdiction of the
FCC and one of the antitrust agencies—which almost always means the
Department of Justice, although it could be the FTC under some
circumstances—to review mergers in the telecom space. So, today mergers
within the jurisdiction of the FCC have to be approved by the FCC and have to
be notified to the Justice Department under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act and
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effectively cleared if they’re going to proceed, and the question is whether it
makes sense to have this kind of dual review or, if we’re thinking about reform
of the telecom regulatory space on a forward-going basis, should we think
about a different kind of arrangement.
Before getting to the nitty-gritty, I just want you to ask yourself from an
institutional design perspective, what does it suggest when you have two
separate institutions that have to approve something? So think about
bicameralism, for example, and this being The Federalist Society, after all, we
can think about the constitutional design. The fact that new laws have to pass
both the House and the Senate, of course, makes it harder for new laws to pass
and to become effective as the law of the land, as compared to, say, a
parliamentary system where a single chamber has to decide on new laws.
Of course, the framers of our Constitution were well aware of this, and in
fact, they justified the difficulty of getting laws passed by two chambers or two
houses of Congress as an important aspect of the preservation of liberty, since
it became harder to legislate.
Now, of course, when the question is not whether new laws should be
passed but whether a merger should be allowed and you have a dual review
model in place, the dual review model is not creating protections for freedom
but obstacles, higher obstacles to getting business deals done.
So, just for example, in the recent AT&T/T-Mobile transaction that some
folks on this panel may have had something to do with, it’s almost certainly the
case that AT&T had a much harder time, a much harder battle in persuading
two agencies at once to clear the deal than it would have had if it had only
faced one of the agencies. And, of course, AT&T/T-Mobile, that deal fell
through because of the opposition of both agencies.
Now, again, I’m not suggesting that the decision was necessarily wrong,
just to point out that if you’re looking at the structure of agency decisionmaking, having to go through two agencies is, of course, more difficult than
just going through one.
Now, you might not be motivated to care about this unless I can tell you a
story about lots of good deals facing a sort of systematic obstacle to
completion that sort of justifies the view that we have excessive regulation
because of dual agency review. Of course, the problem with making that claim
is an endogeneity problem. The mergers and acquisitions that get proposed are
the ones that smart telecom lawyers and reasonable business people reading the
regulatory landscape think have a high degree of likelihood of getting
approved, given dual review. So, it’s not surprising that we see relatively few
cases, like AT&T/T-Mobile, where the deal is completely disallowed. Smart
lawyers and business people will avoid bringing these kinds of mergers in the
first place.
What we do see, on the other hand, is lots of deals that are ultimately
approved, subject to extensive conditions imposed by both agencies, so these
can be divestiture requirements and/or conduct commitment, such as
nondiscrimination or compulsory licensing of various kinds, just to give some
examples.
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When you look at the overall pattern of dual review in the last few
decades, a general pattern emerges. In very few cases do you see both
agencies requiring exactly the same relief in terms of conditions or
commitments. Most of the time, you will see an overlapping core by both
agencies agreeing on some common set of conditions necessary for the merger
to proceed with a number of extras on one side or often on both. So, for
example, you will see the FCC requiring divestitures in seven markets and the
DOJ requiring divestitures in eight markets, or the FCC accepting all the
conditions in the DOJ consent decree, but adding a list of additional conditions
or divestitures.
So, for example, in the AT&T/Bell South deal, one of the conditions
imposed by the FCC was that 3,000 jobs that were currently outsourced outside
the United States be repatriated to the United States. Now, one response is that
this is just a product of the separate statutory mandates—the FCC having a
broader public interest mandate than the DOJ, which only looks at competition
issues—but again that would suggest that the pattern would always be the FCC
requiring more than the DOJ, and sometimes there are cases when the DOJ, in
fact, requires extra things that the FCC does not require in its conditions.
Just looking at a spreadsheet of dual review cases over the last few
decades, one certainly gets the impression that each agency wants to be able to
claim and extract some extra goodies out of merger review. Indeed, if both
agencies were extracting exactly the same proverbial pound of flesh, then what
would be the point of having two agencies? Well, that of course begs the
question: what is the point of having two agencies reviewing the same
transactions?
Laughter.
PROFESSOR DANIEL CRANE: Of course, the problem also gets worse than this.
It is not just that the two agencies extract different pounds of flesh; it’s that
sometimes they make inconsistent demands on the merging parties. For
example, the DOJ—looking at antitrust principles—generally wants
divestitures, divested assets to be sold to buyers that are firmly established in
the market in order to ensure that the divested assets play a meaningful role in
checking the merging firm’s market power. By contrast, the FCC has often
pushed for divestitures to smaller players or new entrants in order to foster a
greater diversity of voices in the marketplace. So, the parties making a
decision about seeking a merger or an acquisition have to worry not only about
the prospect of running the gauntlet of two different agencies reviewing their
transaction and each extracting their own pound of flesh, but also that the
agencies may make inconsistent demands, which can slow down or complicate
the process of getting the merger approved.
So then what’s the solution? Well, the core, in my view, is that we
should think about the possibility of giving only one agency jurisdiction over
mergers in this space, but perhaps allow the other agency an advisory function,
as is true of the Justice Department’s advisory function in certain categories of
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bank mergers where the actual decision is made by the banking regulator, but
DOJ plays an advisory function. If we were to go this route, the question is
which agency, of course, and I am not firmly committed to a view on this. I
just sort of think out loud a little bit. One thing that the FCC has, as I said
before, is a broader statutory mandate. If we think that the public interest
mandate of the FCC is important in the telecom space and that is broader than
simply achieving competition and efficiency, then it would make sense to have
the FCC taking the lead since it has a more comprehensive mandate. That also
subsumes, in some sense, the mandate of the DOJ.
On the other hand and reflecting now on some of comments particularly
by Commissioner Pai about technological convergence and changing industrial
segments—so, for example, we think that the distinction between pipes and
content is too sharp, and that in some sense, sort of transmission or pipes and
content are lines that are less important than they were years ago, then that
really suggests that there are segments outside of the FCC’s jurisdiction and
within the DOJ’s jurisdiction that would need sort of common supervision by a
single agency, at which point the argument would be that we should have a
single competition law framework to address telecom mergers, as is true of
some adjacent spaces not within the FCC’s regulatory jurisdiction.
So, for the time being, I’m agnostic on the solution but firmly committed
to the view that there is a problem in need of discussion. President Obama,
who I understand has been reelected—
Laughter.
PROFESSOR DANIEL CRANE: —has previously spoken in favor of eliminating
regulatory review by multiple agencies, about eliminating duplication and
agency jurisdiction, and in streamlining regulatory processes, so my question is
why not here as well? Thank you.
JUDGE JENNIFER W. ELROD: Thank you very much. Professor Baker, why not
here as well?
PROFESSOR JONATHAN B. BAKER: Thank you, Judge Elrod. I’m delighted to
be here and on a panel with so many distinguished colleagues from agencies
and academia.
I mostly want to react to the issues that Dan raised. Dan mainly
seemed—well, or at least he toys with the idea of giving the FCC exclusive
jurisdiction over competition issues that arise in communications and industry
mergers, and it’s worth noting that he is not alone in seemingly preferring or at
least considering preferring—you’re agnostic, ultimately, I guess—economic
regulation over competition and antitrust enforcement, because that echoes
how the Supreme Court came out twice during the past decade in both Trinko3

3.

Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 411–16 (2004).
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and Credit Suisse.4
And before that, the critics of concurrent jurisdiction invariably took the
other side that Dan somewhat is sympathetic to of giving exclusive jurisdiction
to the antitrust enforcement agencies on the view that preferring antitrust
would be the more deregulatory approach.
Well, what I want to argue for this morning is preserving concurrent
jurisdiction as likely to lead to the best results in merger review, because that
approach takes advantage of the complementary strengths of the sector
regulator and the antitrust enforcement agency. So I want to sketch first a
couple of advantages of the FCC in merger review, in communications
transactions.
One of them is communications industry expertise, so both in terms of
how the industry works and how the regulations that are in the background
operate. So in the AT&T/T-Mobile merger review, the FCC’s engineers were
an invaluable resource for evaluating the potential efficiencies, and they were
invaluable not just to the FCC but also to the Antitrust Division. They
provided analysis that was both reliable and independent of any of the parties
to the merger, and the agencies needed that.
In the Comcast/NBCU transaction, the FCC’s expertise on how its
program access rules operate was critical for both the FCC and the Justice
Department in fashioning a remedy.
But aside from ex-communications industry expertise, the FCC has
another advantage, its greater ability in practice to address potential
competition issues. These can be important for evaluating mergers in fastmoving markets. The competition agencies have trouble protecting potential
competition when they challenge mergers in court, because generalist judges,
like our colleague here, don’t have prior industry expertise, although I don’t
really know whether you have communications expertise, so I will take that
back.
Laughter.
PROFESSOR JONATHAN B. BAKER: But generalist judges—most judges don’t
have that kind of expertise or may not be able to evaluate prediction about how
the industry will evolve very easily, and might view them as speculative, while
the communications agency may have a great understanding of how the
industry works.
And the antitrust agencies, on the other hand, have complementary
advantages in merger view, which is why you want them involved, as well.
One is their competition expertise. They understand how to evaluate
competition issues because they do it all the time, and another is their greater
practical ability to obtain information about the industry. There is a larger
issue in that. Sector regulators commonly or at least historically have often
been thought to be prone to agency capture. I don’t mean to say that they are
4.

Credit Suisse Sec. (USA), LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 283–85 (2007).
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all necessarily and always captured, but there has definitely been a concern
about that, by which I mean coming to favor the industry, the interest of the
regulated industry over public interest concerns, for example, protecting
competition.
I don’t think the problem of capture is political influence, because if
Congress pushes an agency to favor industry interests over the public interest,
then the captured body is Congress, not the agency. And I don’t think it’s the
revolving door, because that mainly operates to bring good people into the
agencies and often keep them there.
But when there’s a problem of industry capture—and this is consistent
with the economic literature on the subject—it generally comes from the
ability of the industry to manage information. So the FCC has all this
engineering and economic expertise, but it only goes so far without data, and
the competition agencies, on the other hand, get more information using
compulsory process in merger review than the FCC can obtain through its
routine data collection that is going on independent of those transaction
reviews, or its own use of compulsion, particularly in a political environment
where FCC information requests are questioned as imposing unnecessary
burdens on industry. That question doesn’t come up with the antitrust
agencies, because they are seen as doing law enforcement.
When reviewing mergers, the FCC staff cannot do what the DOJ and FTC
staff routinely do, which is call up customers or learn about what to investigate
from industry participants who are not eager to make submissions on an
adjudicative record, because it’s a formal adjudication when you review a
merger at the FCC.
So Dan raises two concerns about concurrent review, and I will end by
commenting on those. Dan worries about overregulation, but I would say that
concurrent review leads to better regulation because the two agencies can share
their expertise in complementary areas, and what the antitrust agency learns
can generally be brought into the FCC’s adjudicative record.
And Dan’s other concern is with the cost of coordination, but my
experience from working on merger reviews that were both simultaneously
looked at by the FCC and the Justice Department is that this concern is largely
theoretical, that the Justice Department and the Federal Communications
Commission had no trouble coordinating merger reviews in either
Comcast/NBCU or AT&T/T-Mobile, including harmonizing relief in the
Comcast matter. And one reason that happened, by the way, that coordination
was so successful is that the FCC’s Chairman and the Assistant Attorney
General had selected senior staff who knew each other and knew how the other
agency worked. I think that experience shows there is no inherent problem
with coordination, and that the concern is really more hypothetical than real.
So let me just stop my defense of concurrent jurisdiction and end here and
let Maureen talk about how communications regulation looks like from the
perspective of an antitrust agency or really an antitrust and consumer
protection agency, so thank you.

No. 1]

COMMUNICATIONS LAW REFORM

123

JUDGE JENNIFER W. ELROD: Commissioner?
MAUREEN K. OHLHAUSEN: Thank you. As a sitting Commissioner, I’ll join
my other sitting Commissioners and stay seated during my remarks.
Laughter.
MAUREEN K. OHLHAUSEN: But thank you, Judge, and thank you to The
Federalist Society for having me here today. I’m delighted to be part of this
panel.
Building on what a number of the other panelists have said, I wanted to
talk a little bit about what is the right approach in an area of—for government
regulation in an area where markets and technologies really are converging.
So to give you a little background about the FTC, we have a very broad
statute in Section 5 of the FTC Act, unfair and deceptive acts or practices that
are affecting commerce and unfair methods of competition, and that’s a lot as
to be very flexible over the years throughout a number of industries in
enforcing both the consumer protection and antitrust powers. I think that that
model also fits today’s very convergent communications environment very
well, rather than sort of the soiled approach that Commissioner Pai talked
about previously.
One of the small challenges to this is that the FTC still has a common
carrier exemption in its statute, but I kind of look at that as an island that the
river has really started to go around, because so few services are now
considered common carrier services.
ROBERT M. MCDOWELL: Oh, just wait.
Laughter.
MAUREEN K. OHLHAUSEN: And I’ll also put in the caveat that the FCC’s
interpretation of whether something is a common carrier doesn’t necessarily
control the FTC’s jurisdiction.
ROBERT M. MCDOWELL: So there.
Laughter.
MAUREEN K. OHLHAUSEN: —but that is certainly one of those factors that I’m
sure a court would consider.
That’s one of the reasons why a few years ago, the FTC started the
Internet Access Task Force that I headed up, and we looked at the issue. It
involves net neutrality at the time, and the question was, given the movement
towards so much being over the Internet, were special rules needed to require
nondiscrimination on the Internet, open access, the Internet freedoms kind of
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issue.
As we looked at it as an agency, we came to the conclusion in a report we
issued in 2007 that said, you know, while there is the potential for problems to
develop, it seemed that the traditional tools of antitrust and consumer
protection could address these problems.5 Antitrust is very well suited to look
at exclusionary conduct, discriminatory conduct, and the consumer protection
role can’t also be overlooked. A lot of these issues involve if a—a lot of the
theories of what the problems would be involve did a consumer sign up for a
broadband service, and then they weren’t getting what they were promised,
whether it was speeds or whether it was certain content that was disfavored.
Well, that’s a very traditional consumer protection kind of issue, and if a
provider had made a promise and then didn’t live up to it, you don’t need a
new and special rule to address that. We have Section 5 of the FTC Act. So
we’ve looked at that. So that was our recommendation, kind of taking a waitand-see approach, particularly because—I have actually a quote here, “In
evaluating whether new prescriptions are necessary, we advise proceeding with
caution before enacting broad ex ante restrictions in an unsettled dynamic
environment.”6 And I don’t think that advice has really changed in the past
five years. I haven’t seen something that says, “Ah, here is the big problem in
the market. Here is where we should have been, you know, waiting for these
problems to develop.” I think it sort of said, “Well, you know, things seem to
be moving along okay.”
I also wanted to mention, while it is true that the Department of Justice—
because of the common carrier exemption—while it is true that the Department
of Justice has done much of the oversight in the telecommunications area, the
FTC has always shared jurisdiction with the Department of Justice in things
like cable mergers and as in Internet and testimony in general. So the FTC, I
think, is well positioned, along with the DOJ, to continue to play a role here.
So pivoting from sort of this general approach to merger review in
particular, I do think that Dan and Jon do bring up some good issues, but the
question that I have is a lot of the issues they are raising are not really specific
to the telecommunications industry. There’s a lot of fast-moving technology
industries that the antitrust agencies have to review, and that I think the
antitrust agencies have been able to review pretty well, so telecommunications
is hardly alone in being of that kind of industry.
I also think that having a general non-industry-specific regulator or
decider in antitrust areas brings a lot of benefits. First of all, I think Dan talked
a little bit about predictability for businesses, the hurdle of having to please
two regulators, is that problem. I think there is a fair amount of amount of
predictability in the antitrust review model based on the years and years of
experience that we have. We have horizontal merger guidelines. Sometimes
we have industry-specific guidance maybe in the healthcare area, as a good
example of that, but there is a really specialized body of knowledge out there

5.
6.

FED. TRADE COMM’N, BROADBAND CONNECTIVITY COMPETITION POLICY (2007).
Id.
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that practitioners are familiar with. I think there is a good likelihood of a quick
resolution. When we’re operating under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, there are
timelines that we have to meet.7 There’s expertise and procedural tools in
developing the factual record quickly and efficiently, and I also think there’s a
lot of certainty that comes from the narrower standard review of a substantial
lessening of competition—that’s the standard under the antitrust laws—rather
than the more general public interest standard. The public interest standard is
very elastic, and that can vary quite a lot over the years.
There has really been a lot of case law, agency thinking, and federal case
law, on what is the substantial lessening of competition, and it is much more
targeted to antitrust concerns, competition concerns, and I think that that is
what accounts for some of the differences in the review in the relief that the
agencies would require between the FCC and the antitrust agencies. The
public interest standard, as I said, is very elastic. It could require a lot of
different things. Sometimes the antitrust standard may require maybe more
divestitures or a different type of oversight, but that’s, I think, coming from
their expertise and what they see as competitive problems that they’ve seen
across time.
Also, the question is always once you impose a remedy, how successful
will that remedy be? How well will the divestiture work? What kind of
compliance do you have and do the antitrust agencies have those aspects in
place? I’m not saying that the FCC doesn’t, but the FTC and the DOJ do this
all the time. We just reviewed a merger of Hertz and Dollar Thrifty. It just got
approved the other day, extensive divestitures required, lots of compliance
required, but that’s the kind of thing that over time the agencies have
developed a lot of expertise in making sure that—I mean, it’s not a great
outcome if you have a merger challenge. You saw there were some
divestitures, but then the remedy doesn’t work very well—I think that the
agencies have paid a lot of attention on that, and that may account for some of
the differences in the kinds of divestitures that might be required.
I recall a number of years ago—and, Jon, you may have been at the FTC
when we did this—there was a study of the success of divestitures, and it had
some surprising results, if I recall.8 It wasn’t necessarily that the big player,
that if you divested the asset to the big player that it was the most successful;
the small player was most successful. It was actually the medium-size player I
think that had the best results in some of the divestitures, so a little bit
counterintuitive, but the idea that the public interest standard might have you
divesting to a different type of buyer than what an antitrust agency might do.
It’s something important to keep in mind.
And then just to focus on one other thing about the difference between a
generalist agency, I guess is a better way to put it, versus a specialized
agency—so the FTC and DOJ are very generalist agencies, and we don’t see
the same players before us all the time. I mean, the FTC might receive oil,
7. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
8. FED. TRADE COMM’N, A STUDY OF THE COMMISSION’S DIVESTURE PROCESS (1999).
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might receive pharmaceuticals, you know, fairly consistently. Well, there’s a
very wide range of industries that come before us, and so that, I think, keeps
the standards a little more general, a little less industry-specific, in a good way,
because one of the things that I think can develop in an agency—and we see
this. This isn’t just FCC-oriented. We also see this in FDA, pharmaceutical
companies, where you’ve got so many proceedings before an agency that are
so important to your company that there is, I think, a concern that outside of
one proceeding. So if a company is pushing too hard in one proceeding, the
agency doesn’t like what they’re saying or what they’re doing, there is the fear
that the agency could take retaliatory action in another proceeding, totally
unrelated to the merger but maybe just as crucial to the agency. So, for
example, in drug review, that could be a problem at the FDA. I imagine
similar concerns could arise in the FCC. It’s like, “Well, I have to go back to
the same people and ask for my license review, and we have this other
proceedings that’s very important to us,” so that creates, I think, a dynamic that
a generalist antitrust oversight doesn’t create.
So that’s my pitch for the generalist antitrust oversight and the FTC in
particular, given our unique blend of both consumer protection and antitrust
oversight.
JUDGE JENNIFER W. ELROD: Thank you all for your introductory statements.
Does anybody else want to weigh in on the generalist? Do you feel like you
need to have a counterpoint?
PROFESSOR JONATHAN B. BAKER: I’m happy to get—
JUDGE JENNIFER W. ELROD: You’re happy to move along. Well, good. We’ll
move along.
You know, we heard about this international approach in the Internet
realm, and I’ll bet many people in the audience had not heard about these
proposals. Probably, a number of people had not even heard that we were a
member of this international body, and so I’m sure this is very alarming news
to some. But I wonder, would there be some on our panel who might think
that the net neutrality rules that have been imposed are just an incremental way
to begin our own government’s regulation of the Internet? Does anybody want
to comment on that?
ROBERT M. MCDOWELL: Sure, real quick. Maybe we both can.
So absolutely, so big concerns there as well. Of course, this is the
December 21, 2010, FCC order on net neutrality before the D.C. Circuit,
perhaps one of the longest appeal time horizons in a long time.9 Hopefully, it
will be decided next year, but there was no issue that needed to be resolved.
The FCC doesn’t have the statutory authority to resolve the problem, should
9. FCC, FCC 10-201, IN
PRACTICES (2010).
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there be one.
There were ample laws on the books to address any problems, as alleged
by the proponents of these regulations, if they actually ever existed, which they
don’t, and some are with the FTC Act or antitrust laws, et cetera, so a lot of
problems there. I’ve said this before, a couple things, which is, one, it’s just
another step of government into this space, which is not needed and is actually
counterproductive, and it’s counterproductive for consumers, and then number
two, the FCC launched in the summer of 2010, opened a proceeding called the
Title 2 docket. You heard Commissioner Pai speak for Title 2 out of the
Communications Act is what regulates monopoly voice phone service, and so
Internet access, broadband Internet access would be classified as a monopoly
phone service. And the logic is the same as to what is trying to be done to the
Internet on the international level. So there are a lot of concerns here.
That docket remains open, and after the November 6 election, I am
concerned about what will happen when the D.C. Circuit strikes down the
FCC’s net neutrality order under a different legal theory called Title 1 and
some other stuff they threw in there and—imaginative stuff—and so there is
this Title 2 docket sitting there. What’s going to be done with that? There will
be tremendous political pressure from the left for the FCC to classify this piece
of the Internet under Title 2, all with the argument it will make it skinny, we
will wall it off, blah, blah, blah. So it’s a huge concern.
JUDGE JENNIFER W. ELROD: Do you want to comment?
AJIT V. PAI: If I could add just a brief gloss on Commissioner McDowell’s
comments, with which I associate myself fully. Regardless of how the net
neutrality debate goes in the D.C. Circuit, the basic question there is going to
continue to resonate, and that question is, does the government have a role in
the decisions on network management that a private sector actor makes? In
this case, net neutrality is a very high-profile example of that question, but
there are all sorts of things flying under the radar now that have come up in the
six months that I have been at the Commission.
Just to give you one example, some of our colleagues at the Commission
are now making noises about the impropriety of usage-based pricing, and so a
lot of companies in order to manage network congestion, which is occasioned
by the fact that if the top 5 or 10% of their users consume 80, 90% of the
bandwidth, are now implementing usage-based pricing, so that you pay for
what you use. Most of us in the consumer context are very used to this
proposition. You wouldn’t go into a fancy restaurant and say, “I’m going to
eat all I can,” and then pay you a very low price no matter how much I eat, but
in this context, people have gotten so used to consuming as much as they want
and paying a set price that the Commission is now taking that instinct and
trying to internalize it to require companies potentially not to make usagebased pricing a basis of their pricing policy. That is a sort of Rubicon, because
once you give the government a role in second-guessing the network
management decisions that a private actor makes, there’s really no way to
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cabinet, I mean, other than relying upon the discretion of three or hopefully
five members of the Federal Communications Commission. So that’s another
issue to be mindful of in addition to net neutrality. It’s going to bubble up in a
lot of different contexts, and we need to keep an eye on it.
JUDGE JENNIFER W. ELROD: Professor Baker? Oh.
MAUREEN K. OHLHAUSEN: I actually also wanted to mention one of the things
that really concerns me on the open Internet, the net neutrality requirements, I
believe there’s no market power screen, right? So you can have a very small
player who is offering a service that doesn’t necessarily give a full panoply of
Internet access, and that might be because of bandwidth constrictions or
because of technology restrictions, but that wouldn’t be permitted. And I think
that could be problematic under the order because it’s not that you’re
excluding a large part of the market or that you’re doing something that really
could be hurting any particular other content provider, all the things that went
into the creation of the network neutrality order, the kinds of concerns, and
you’re impeding the ability to use assets in a way that might be a higher value
to use, like an asset that doesn’t necessarily have the full bandwidth, doesn’t
have the new wide channel, and you’re saying, “Well, this small channel”—
you still have to offer everything or you violate the order. And I don’t see how
that makes consumers better off, because ultimately what we should be caring
about is, is this action going to make the consumers better off?
JUDGE JENNIFER W. ELROD: It looks like this is a popular topic, so I think
everyone else wants to weigh in. Also, when you weigh in, I’d be interested to
hear whether people think it’s moot, because the technology has changed since
the advent of the rules, the idea that people are getting things from the mobile
carriers so much. I’d like to hear that as well.
PROFESSOR DANIEL CRANE: Why don’t you go ahead? I’m going to change
the topic a little bit, so why don’t you go ahead.
PROFESSOR JONATHAN B. BAKER: All right. So let me—I seem to be in the
position of taking the other side.
Laughter.
PROFESSOR JONATHAN B. BAKER: So I agree that, historically, the Internet has
worked fine, basically. There’s little things that happen, but basically that—
but where I think the big difference between the people who think that there’s
something worth doing in the Open Internet Order that was a good idea and the
people who don’t has to do with the diagnosis. My sense is that the implicit
presumption of my colleagues on the panel, let’s say, is that the reason that
everything has basically been fine in the Internet world until now is the
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absence of regulation.
What I would say is, well, no, that’s not it. It’s the absence of
discrimination, and so that would justify the kind of light-touch regulatory
approach that the FCC did implement in the Open Internet Order, that just
broad, general rules about transparency and non-blocking and
nondiscrimination.
Now, I don’t want to take a position on any dispute that has taken place
since the Open Internet Order, and I don’t really know the details about it, but
just reading that order, there’s a lot of sympathy for congestion pricing and
allowing firms the ability to make network management decisions that
Commissioner Pai is worried about. And my sense is that the order was never
intended to be some sort of across-the-board hostility to network management
decisions that address congestion questions. I could imagine there would be
individual cases where there would be some kind of issue, but I don’t know
about them.
The other broad-picture comment about the Open Internet Order, which
hasn’t come up here, but I just want to raise it because it does come up, is that
people worry about, talk about whether it would interfere with investment.
When people worry about that, it is a partial focus. It is on the investment by
the platform operators, which is a legitimate issue and one that was considered
in developing the rules, but the point of the story, of the rules, is in part to
make sure we also get investment in what are called “edge providers” in the
rules, people making applications and other kinds of—not just the platform
itself but the people developing uses for it, equipment and applications and the
like.
Then if I could go on and talk about convergence for a second, I largely
agree with what Commissioner Pai had to say about the problems that
changing technology create for the regulatory scheme. I want to give a little
perspective on it, which is that when I worked—this was before Commissioner
Pai entered the communications field, but when I worked in the Clinton
administration White House on communications issues, among other things, it
was the run-up to the 1996 Act.10 I recall a great deal of conversation we had,
multiple occasions, a lot of serious thought about it, about whether we wanted
to propose a new title to the Communications Act that would deal with bit
companies, when the cable company started to look like the phone company
and vice versa.
Now, it didn’t happen then. There were a lot more pressing issues from
the point of view of the industry, for example, that took priority in developing
the 1996 Act, but I agree that we are sort of seeing the problem now. But that
doesn’t mean that—what I want to caution is, the fact that we’re getting
convergence doesn’t mean that every service is somehow automatically
competitive. It doesn’t mean that there aren’t going to be natural monopoly
elements still that would require regulation, and so one has to look in detail at
how the industry is developing and create a regulatory structure, craft one that
10.

Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 129–30 (1996).
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fits the industry today. But I’m sympathetic to the project of trying to do that,
which Commissioner Pai has embarked on.
JUDGE JENNIFER W. ELROD: Professor Crane?
PROFESSOR DANIEL CRANE: So I just wanted to go in a slightly different
direction, which is to say actually I think that net neutrality is problematic in
principle, but also just be aware of neutrality creep, which is net neutrality is
converging into search neutrality, and this is obviously a topic that will be
addressed in upcoming days or months in terms of the possible Google case,
but there is a general sense in certain corridors that there should be a regulatory
neutrality principle that not only applies sort of to providers but also to search
engines and various spaces on the Internet. My own view is a general idea that
the government has an obligation to mandate a certain kind of neutrality on the
Internet is really pernicious and one that has no logic in it.
ROBERT M. MCDOWELL: Can I say a couple quick things?
JUDGE JENNIFER W. ELROD: You bet.
ROBERT M. MCDOWELL: I know you want to move on, but there’s some
important things that have been said, and I will try to be as quick as I can,
because I know we’re running short on time.
First of all, I’m just going to go through a very quick checklist of things
to rehash here, and I’ll try not to say anything else. It was implied earlier that
we had something to do with the AT&T/T-Mobile merger.
Both
Commissioner Pai and I have really good alibis. First of all, it was never put to
a Commission vote, and his alibi is even more airtight. He wasn’t even
confirmed yet.
Laughter.
ROBERT M. MCDOWELL: Neither one of us had really anything to do with it. It
was a staff decision. It never got to what we call the 8-4 for a commissioner
vote. I wanted to set that straight.
So when it comes to dual review, by the way, first of all, Congress tells
me what to do. I don’t tell Congress what to do, but I do think it’s redundant.
I think the FCC could provide an advisory role, but if I were advising
Congress—and I’ve been asked this question many times by members of
Congress—that the redundancy there is quite onerous.
I just had a small company in my office going through this dual review
process. It was very expensive for them, and I think this also kind of weaves
into Commissioner Pai’s opening remarks. When we are looking at a new
statute—and I’m going to plug Randy’s book here for a minute. Randy May
has edited a great new book called—well, I haven’t read it yet, but I did read
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the Table of Contents.
Laughter.
ROBERT M. MCDOWELL: I read the Table of Contents, and they’re fantastic,
and so Communications Law and Policy in the Digital Age.11 And I’ve seen
some of the authors and the names and some of the titles of some of the
chapters, and it’s fantastic. But we need to relook at this, as Commissioner Pai
said, these stove-piped—you know, if you provide a service over twisted
copper pair, there’s one set of laws. If it’s over coaxial cable, it’s another set
of laws. If it’s over the air one way, it’s another set of laws. If it’s over the air
another way, it’s another set of laws. From the consumer’s perspective, things
have changed. They want their content and their applications delivered over
whatever platform it is they want, and by the way, that signal is traversing fiber
and copper and coax and the airwaves, before it ever gets to them, so how do
you account for that? So, absolutely, we need to modernize the rules. They go
back certainly to the 1800s and railroad regulation, which goes back to like
seventeenth-century canal regulation, so I think this is due for an overhaul.
When it comes to net neutrality, real quick, I think it’s important for folks
to, as Commissioner Pai said, this was a rule—series of rules—regulating
network management. There was absolutely no market analysis done by the
FCC, zero. The four or five cases cited by the FCC, I think when you look at
the quadrillions of Internet communications every hour, it doesn’t even rise to
the level of de minimis. All those cases were resolved under existing law. I
think that’s very powerful. So there is no factual need to do this, and I think
having no market analysis is very powerful. What you really saw this all about
was the most common request we get at the FCC, when you boil it down to its
nub, is please regulate my rival but not me.
Laughter.
ROBERT M. MCDOWELL: So when we talk about regulatory capture, actually
the FCC is often presented with—not regulating or not regulating an industry,
it’s which industry are you picking. And in this case, it’s application providers
and content providers who want to put costs on network operators in the
absence of a finding of a concentration of market power, abuse of that power,
resulting in consumer harm, which I think should be the basic three-part test of
any new statute.
Then to cite investment, CAPEX in networks has actually stalled out at
$66 billion per year. From 2010 to 2011, it stalled out. That’s a robust
number, but we want to see it go up. Don’t know. We don’t know. I’m going
to underline that fact. We don’t know if it’s because of the Open Internet
Order or not, but it was going up during the meltdown of ’08 and ’09 and
11. RANDOLPH J. MAY, COMMUNICATIONS LAW
YEARS (2012).
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leveled out, so we want to know why that is. Investment in apps and content
have been going up. They were going up before the Open Internet Order. So
for the FCC to try to take credit for more investment in apps is like a rooster
taking credit for the sunrise. It really is. It was happening anyway.
Then you’re absolutely right, Your Honor. There is a “moot” in this, if
there was ever a factual basis to begin with, in that we have more competition
in the last mile. The concept of net neutrality is a very old wireline industrial
policy-type mindset of one phone company and maybe one cable company
serving the customer. Well, if you look at market trends, customers are
walking away from that fixed static connection to the Internet and moving to
the wireless world.
In the United States, the average American—well, not the average—over
90% of American consumers have a choice of five wireless carriers, plus
choices of unlicensed use, WiFi, et cetera. So you actually have several
players in the last mile, and when you have that kind of competition in the last
mile, there is a competitive disincentive to act in an anticompetitive way.
Lastly, we need to be careful not to use the word “discrimination.”
“Discrimination” is a dirty word in many contexts. To a network engineer, it’s
a good word. It means you want quality of service. If you’re downloading a
video, you want those video bits to take priority over your email bits. That is
discrimination, and that’s what consumers are actually demanding. They’re
actually demanding—they don’t know it, but they’re demanding
discrimination. So, in the network context, discrimination is a good thing, and
that’s what the net neutrality order starts to disrupt. You end up with five FCC
Commissioners. You only need a vote of three. I love all of my colleagues,
but not one of us is an engineer. I think we’re all liberal arts majors. So you
really don’t want us making engineering decisions, right? Then you start
politicizing engineering and business decisions.
Now I’ll shut up. Thank you.
JUDGE JENNIFER W. ELROD: Well, that brings me to a question that I think a
layperson would be able to relate to, and I am going to ask you, Commissioner
Pai. It’s my understanding that there are over 3,695 pages of rules, and it has
grown over 800% in the past fifty years. And it’s also my understanding that
Congress has specifically said in 47 U.S.C. § 161(b) that every two years, you
are periodically charged with going through and eliminating redundant,
obsolete rules and actually doing that. I’m wondering, is it being done—I
don’t think so—and why not? Congress said so.
AJIT V. PAI: That’s a great question, and one of the things I noted when I was
in the Office of General Counsel, one of my tasks was to compile the reports
that were required under Section 11 of the Communications Act, codified at
Section 161(b). I was always amazed that so much staff time was spent
tracking down all these rules, putting them together in a nice report, bundling
them up, sending them upstairs where they went nowhere, and it was sort of
viewed—and it continues to be viewed—as essentially necessary
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administrative act that doesn’t have any real importance, but Congress told us
to do it, so here, we’ll go ahead and do it.
One of the first things I called for when I got to the Commission was to
make Section 11, which is known internally as “biannual reviews,” as we
review these regulations every two years, a really meaningful exercise in
reviewing the state of our regulations. So when we institutionalize the
importance of it, in my opinion, it is to require a Commission-level vote.
Commissioner McDowell and I and our three colleagues, ourselves have to sit
down and look at the list, and if we determine that a regulation was not
necessary in the interest of competition, which is the Section 11 standard, we
would remove it, and we would explain why. Then we would transmit to
Congress our determinations. It doesn’t even necessarily have to be in the
context of biannual review that we engage in this exercise. One of the other
things we could do is regularly incorporate sunset clauses into some of the
regulatory orders that we issue, so that even if an idea is good in year one, in
year three competitive conditions could change. This is a very dynamic
industry, and so it would be helpful for us to be forced to review those
regulations as opposed to letting them sit on the books, which is why you end
up with such things as the Fairness Doctrine twenty-five years or so after its
erasure, formal erasure, continues to be in the C.F.R. and other regulations like
that.
I am hopeful that we can breathe new life into Section 11 and into the rest
of our rules by requiring periodic and meaningful review to determine whether
or not they continue to be necessary.
JUDGE JENNIFER W. ELROD: Does anyone else want to comment on that?
MAUREEN K. OHLHAUSEN: The FTC is under similar requirements, and we do
actually have a process and have gotten rid of some rules, so that has been a
bipartisan effort over the years. But some of the rules are, frankly, hilarious.
The Frosted Cocktail Glass Rule,12 we can get rid of that one and a few others
along those lines.
JUDGE JENNIFER W. ELROD: We have just—I’m sorry.
MAUREEN K. OHLHAUSEN: You didn’t know there was a rule about frosted
cocktail glasses.
JUDGE JENNIFER W. ELROD: We have just a few minutes. If you have a
question, you may approach the microphone at this time.
ATTENDEE: I am Frank Shepherd [ph]. I am from the Provinces. I never ask a
question, but I can’t help myself.

12.

16 C.F.R. § 417 (1969).
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I am listening to all of this about AT&T and T-Mobile and all this stuff
and regulation, and going from two bodies to one body, and about consumer
protection, and we have to be sure that somebody’s telephone works and all
that stuff. I’m just wondering why we need even one body.
Laughter.
ATTENDEE: You know, I guess I could see it when I was growing up with the
television stations, but right now you have all these companies competing, and
if something goes wrong here, I presume India is going to come in and
compete or China or Vietnam now, I guess, something like that. And I have no
problem, you know, when my car goes bad, if my car person doesn’t fix it, go
to the next car person. So you are worried about protecting me. Well, you all
are smarter than me. I know that. I can see that. That’s why you all are here
and I’m in the Provinces, but you all work in your own world.
And I’m sorry for talking. I do have a question.
JUDGE JENNIFER W. ELROD: Is that your question, why do we need one body?
ATTENDEE: My question is why do we need any body.
JUDGE JENNIFER W. ELROD: Any body. Does anybody want to answer that?
ATTENDEE: Why don’t you all—yeah, I apologize. Why don’t you all either
go find something else to do or go home and be productive?
JUDGE JENNIFER W. ELROD: Does anybody want to respond?
ROBERT M. MCDOWELL: I will just respond. Excellent remarks, a lot of merit
to what you have to say.
ATTENDEE: [Inaudible.]
ROBERT M. MCDOWELL: Congress sets this all up. It’s the law of the land.
There’s an FCC. There’s an FTC. We are implementing statutes, so we need
to have Congress change—we can’t just walk off the job. Well, we could walk
off the job, but there’s still going to be an agency there. So talk to your
members of Congress.
MAUREEN K. OHLHAUSEN: And I did want to mention on the consumer
protection front and the antitrust front, antitrust is often an approach that
focuses on competition in a way that helps make other types of regulation less
necessary, because the competitive market will provide these outcomes to
consumers.
And the on the consumer protection front, I think, generally, yes. For
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many, many transactions, consumers can say, “Hey, this didn’t give me what I
want. I’m going to the next provider,” but there are certain things where we
might call them “credence goods” or things where consumers can’t tell
whether that really gave them the benefit that was promised. So you might
have incentives in the market.
Also, one of the enormous things that the FTC does, which doesn’t get
much discussion on panels, but it’s a huge part of our work, is fraud
enforcement. So you have consumers that are being promised things that just
aren’t delivered. They just aren’t provided in any way, and they lose lots of
money. And there’s not necessarily a market mechanism for a consumer to
say, “Okay, I was scammed by this person. I’m going to go on to the next
person.” We have a lot of kind of big frauds that come in and take a lot of
money from a lot of consumers, and so we try to address those.
But I agree that the basic market mechanisms are the preferred way to
address most of these problems.
JUDGE JENNIFER W. ELROD: Do you have a question?
ATTENDEE: Yeah. And I am going to sound like a statement too, but to preface
the question—the first thing, I am Michael Daugherty. I am, I suppose, one of
the few non-lawyer members of The Federalist Society. I am the President and
CEO of LabMD in Atlanta, Georgia.
I am currently under FTC investigation and litigation with the Federal
Trade Commission, so I assume Ms. Ohlhausen probably will have to refrain
from any commentary, and I am not really going to discuss about that. But in a
general way, I shudder to sort of—the debate about Internet regulation, even, it
makes me think of what happened in Iran when all those people had their cell
phones, and the world could observe what was going on, and then we had
crickets from D.C. So when governments involve themselves in regulating
communications, tread very carefully. You have a sacred duty, and I think it’s
critical if you’re involved to not forget moments like that in the world history,
especially when the world wants to do it.
So I’m in the real world, the business world. You know, the arguments
that maybe judges have to have experience in industries to be able to actually
regulate them, I find I could turn that around easily to say that people that live
in government bubbles for their entire career don’t know anything about
business and inflict great damage when they have power and no knowledge.
And so we have to bridge some more communication here, because the
world is getting smaller, and these things are impacting even greater, and
they’re not taken lightly. And they’re greater than academic discussions.
JUDGE JENNIFER W. ELROD: So what is your question, sir? I’m sorry. I’ve got
a line of people behind you, so go ahead.
ATTENDEE: I am right there.

136

JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & POLICY

[Vol. 2013

JUDGE JENNIFER W. ELROD: Okay.
ATTENDEE: So the question really is, since you people understand that you
necessarily have to be involved in government and on regulatory bodies—and
I’m not against that—what self-regulation do you do, so the elephant doesn’t
become the vampire?
JUDGE JENNIFER W. ELROD: Anyone want to tackle that?
PROFESSOR DANIEL CRANE: I’m not in government. I’ll sit back.
AJIT V. PAI: I mean, I’ll just answer in ten seconds in answering just for
myself, although I suspect Commissioner McDowell and Commissioner
Ohlhausen might agree, every single order that comes to my desk, I try to
review through the prism of what will incentivize the private sector to continue
to take risks to make investment decisions, and if, in my opinion, what the
Commission is proposing to do would create more regulatory uncertainty,
would impede competition, would intrude upon the business decisions that a
company owner like yourself has to make, then I won’t support it.
So having worked at Verizon in-house for a couple of years, I was keenly
sensitive to the fact that these are regulated industries that have to incorporate
the necessary evil of regulation into their business plans, but we should try to
minimize that element to the extent necessary.
ROBERT M. MCDOWELL: And ditto. As the Judge pointed out in my
introduction, before I got to the Commission, I was sixteen years in the private
sector, so I consider myself a temporary occupant of this position.
ATTENDEE: I didn’t think you were the one to make that argument.
ROBERT M. MCDOWELL: Pardon me?
ATTENDEE: I didn’t think you were the one that would make that argument.
So, yeah, and I’m not jealous of the FCC jurisdiction, so let’s—so here to
help preserve freedom, ultimately. In case I didn’t make it clear, in the net
neutrality order, I cast a dissenting vote. I have a very long dissent for folks to
read if you ever have insomnia.
Laughter.
ATTENDEE: Blair Gorman, Athens, Georgia.
Commissioner McDowell’s remarks about the ITU put me in mind of an
agenda that was put forward in the 1970s and ’80s through UNESCO for a new
information order, which was in the guise of a more equitable distribution of
media power, but it was really kind of a stalking force for press regulation.
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And in 1984, the Reagan administration had the U.S. withdraw from
UNESCO.
So my question is, first of all, I am interested in who are the proponents
for this expanded role for the ITU and regulating the Internet. Is there an
ideological agenda there? What is the agenda, and can you envision a scenario
in which it would be in the U.S.’s interest to withdraw from the ITU or to curb
its funding?
ROBERT M. MCDOWELL: Excellent question, excellent statement. Love
Athens, Georgia, home of the B-52s and REM and The Producers and other
great bands. Anyway, dating myself there, ’80s bands, all of them.
So we don’t have to belong to the ITU. It’s a matter of sort of federal
diplomatic policy that we do. The ITU is a forum, another context for the
treaties that govern satellite orbital slots. So if you wanted to launch a satellite
tomorrow, anyone just can’t do that. Each country has basically air rights very
high up there for those types of slots.
What frequencies are best for which types of uses, like do you want TV
on a 700-megahertz band or do you want mobile broadband or what do you
want there, so there are other issues there, and they have to be hammered out.
You know, we have border issues, let’s say, with Canada and Mexico, right?
So how do we resolve those disputes? So it’s a forum for that, but it is a large
bureaucracy, and there are literally perhaps dozens of people who read, who sit
in Geneva and read everything the FCC writes on issues, so we’ve got to be
careful what we say and what we do.
But you are absolutely right to point out, we withdrew from UNESCO.
Will there ever come the day where we would withdraw from the ITU? I don’t
see that happening in the near term as a practical matter, but it certainly could
happen someday.
ATTENDEE: I am Sam Murelli [ph]. I am wondering if the Commissioners
think that perhaps the net neutrality missed the point. We see since net
neutrality was sort of decided that we have some vertical integration, where
now the media content creators are also owning the pipes, and then we have
the various rights organizations essentially creating this multi-strike policies
with the ISPs. And I am wondering if we really missed the boat here and if the
issue is not discrimination as a technical matter, but discrimination as a policy
matter where you essentially have the antitrust problem of multiple industries
sort of paying each other off to discriminate on what they let their clients
access, and if that’s really what should be regulated here.
JUDGE JENNIFER W. ELROD: Does anyone want to comment on that?
MAUREEN K. OHLHAUSEN: I guess the fundamental question is, are consumers
worse off, do they have fewer options, are things more expensive, has the
quality gone down? That’s what you really need to look at: What is the impact
of the options for consumers? That is kind of the fundamental thing you look
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at from an antitrust analysis. That would be my starting point.
JUDGE JENNIFER W. ELROD: I think we’re going to have to—oh, did you—
ROBERT M. MCDOWELL: Just real quickly, so excellent point. Is that an UVA
tie or Princeton? I can’t tell if it’s black or blue, but anyway—
Laughter.
ROBERT M. MCDOWELL: So that was one of the arguments made by the
proponents of net neutrality, that somehow there would be an Internet service
provider cutting a deal with a content or application provider to have this anticompetitive type. We log on to Amazon.com, but it cuts over to Borders.com,
vice versa, whatever. But that’s classic, a classic antitrust problem, so that’s a
concentration of market power, abuse of that power that results in consumer
harm. So there’s a solution right there, the antitrust laws.
JUDGE JENNIFER W. ELROD: Mr. May, last question of the day, and I invite you
all to lunch. It is a ticketed event at 12:30 immediately following, and this will
be the last question. Yes.
And I’ll do it even more quickly than I planned in light of lunch being
ready.
PROFESSOR JAMES R. MAY: Commissioner McDowell, number one, thanks for
holding up that book. I appreciate that.
Laughter.
PROFESSOR JAMES R. MAY: But aside from that, you mentioned—
Commissioner Pai raised the issue of consumption-based pricing or usagesensitive pricing as perhaps an important issue facing the Commission and
related in that neutrality, and you said that the engineers appreciate—
”discrimination” is not a dirty word to engineers. You know, it’s not a dirty
word for the economists, either, and also I don’t believe there are any
economists sitting as Commissioners, either, as well as no engineers.
But here is my question. I will just focus it on Jonathan Banker, because
you said—and I appreciate this. You said that the net neutrality order, per se,
does not prohibit this type of discrimination on usage-based, consumptionbased pricing. In fact, they’re not towards allowance for that. But all of the
groups, you know—and this is, I think, is without fail—that supported net
neutrality, whenever there is a consumption-based plan that’s put forward, as
you know, they almost always really—they oppose that.
My question to you, I guess, is you generally favor that, because as an
economist, you appreciate discrimination could be good, but can you give—
you said there may be examples where it’s a bad thing, and I just wonder
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whether you can give some examples of the types of plans that you would
consider not to be good under the—not pass muster under net neutrality.
PROFESSOR JONATHAN B. BAKER: I was largess—out of an abundance of
caution. I didn’t have anything particular in mind. I mean, I’d have to go
home and think about it. It strikes me as possible, but I don’t have an example.
PROFESSOR JAMES R. MAY: You were just preserving the options.
PROFESSOR JONATHAN B. BAKER: Yes, preserving the option to. Yes, exactly.
JUDGE JENNIFER W. ELROD: Thanks. Thanks to our panelists for the excellent
presentation by them. We have such expertise.
Applause.

